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Abstract
Remote Attestation (RA) is a distinct security service that al-
lows a trusted verifier (V rf) to measure the software state of
an untrusted remote prover (P rv). If correctly implemented,
RA allows V rf to remotely detect if P rv is in an illegal or com-
promised state. Although several RA approaches have been
explored (including hardware-based, software-based, and hy-
brid) and many concrete methods have been proposed, compar-
atively little attention has been devoted to formal verification.
In particular, thus far, no RA designs and no implementations
have been formally verified with respect to claimed security
properties.
In this work, we take the first step towards formal verifica-
tion of RA by designing and verifying an architecture called
VRASED: Verifiable Remote Attestation for Simple Embedded
Devices. VRASED instantiates a hybrid (HW/SW) RA co-
design aimed at low-end embedded systems, e.g., simple IoT
devices. VRASED provides a level of security comparable to
HW-based approaches, while relying on SW to minimize ad-
ditional HW costs. Since security properties must be jointly
guaranteed by HW and SW, verification is a challenging task,
which has never been attempted before in the context ofRA. We
believe that VRASED is the first formally verified RA scheme.
To the best of our knowledge, it is also the first formal verifica-
tion of a HW/SW implementation of any security service. To
demonstrate VRASED’s practicality and low overhead, we in-
stantiate and evaluate it on a commodity platform (TI MSP430).
VRASED’s publicly available implementation was deployed on
the Basys3 FPGA.
1 Introduction
The number and variety of special-purpose computing devices
is increasing dramatically. This includes all kinds of embedded
devices, cyber-physical systems (CPS) and Internet-of-Things
(IoT) gadgets, that are utilized in various “smart” settings, such
as homes, offices, factories, automotive systems and public
venues. As society becomes increasingly accustomed to being
surrounded by, and dependent on, such devices, their security
becomes extremely important. For actuation-capable devices,
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malware can impact both security and safety, e.g., as demon-
strated by Stuxnet [48]. Whereas, for sensing devices, malware
can undermine privacy by obtaining ambient information. Fur-
thermore, clever malware can turn vulnerable IoT devices into
zombies that can become sources for DDoS attacks. For exam-
ple, in 2016, a multitude of compromised “smart” cameras and
DVRs formed the Mirai Botnet [2] which was used to mount a
massive-scale DDoS attack (the largest in history).
Unfortunately, security is typically not a key priority for low-
end device manufacturers, due to cost, size or power constraints.
It is thus unrealistic to expect such devices to have the means to
prevent current and future malware attacks. The next best thing
is detection of malware presence. This typically requires some
form of Remote Attestation (RA) – a distinct security service
for detecting malware on CPS, embedded and IoT devices. RA
is especially applicable to low-end embedded devices that are
incapable of defending themselves against malware infection.
This is in contrast to more powerful devices (both embedded
and general-purpose) that can avail themselves of sophisticated
anti-malware protection. RA involves verification of current
internal state (i.e., RAM and/or flash) of an untrusted remote
hardware platform (prover or P rv) by a trusted entity (verifier
or V rf). If V rf detects malware presence, P rv’s software can
be re-set or rolled back and out-of-band measures can be taken
to prevent similar infections. In general, RA can help V rf es-
tablish a static or dynamic root of trust in P rv and can also be
used to construct other security services, such as software up-
dates [42] and secure deletion [39]. Hybrid RA (implemented
as a HW/SW co-design) is a particularly promising approach
for low-end embedded devices. It aims to provide the same
security guarantees as (more expensive) hardware-based ap-
proaches, while minimizing modifications to the underlying
hardware.
Even though numerous RA techniques with different as-
sumptions, security guarantees, and designs, have been pro-
posed [9, 10, 14–16, 19, 20, 24, 29, 34, 37, 37–39, 42], a major
missing aspect of RA is the high-assurance and rigor derivable
from utilizing (automated) formal verification to guarantee
security of the design and implementation of RA techniques.
Because all aforementioned architectures and their implemen-
tations are not systematically designed from abstract models,
their soundness and security can not be formally argued. In
fact, our RA verification efforts revealed that a previous hybrid
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RA design – SMART [20] – assumed that disabling interrupts is
an atomic operation and hence opened the door to compromise
of P rv’s secret key in the window between the time of the in-
vocation of disable interrupts functionality and the time when
interrupts are actually disabled. Another low/medium-end ar-
chitecture – Trustlite [29] – also does not achieve our formal
definition of RA soundness. In particular, this architecture is
vulnerable to self-relocating malware (See [13] for details).
Formal specification of RA properties and their (automated)
verification significantly increases our confidence that such
subtle issues are not overlooked.
In this paper we take a “verifiable-by-design” approach
and develop, from scratch, an architecture for Verifiable
Remote Attestation for Simple Embedded Devices (VRASED).
VRASED is the first formally specified and verified RA archi-
tecture accompanied by a formally verified implementation.
Verification is carried out for all trusted components, including
hardware, software, and the composition of both, all the way
up to end-to-end notions for RA soundness and security. The
resulting verified implementation – along with its computer
proofs – is publicly available [1]. Formally reasoning about,
and verifying, VRASED involves overcoming major challenges
that have not been attempted in the context of RA and, to the
best of our knowledge, not attempted for any security service
implemented as a HW/SW co-design. These challenges in-
clude:
1 – Formal definitions of: (i) end-to-end notions for RA
soundness and security; (ii) a realistic machine model for
low-end embedded systems; and (iii) VRASED’s guaran-
tees. These definitions must be made in single formal system
that is powerful enough to provide a common ground for rea-
soning about their interplay. In particular, our end goal is to
prove that the definitions for RA soundness and security are
implied by VRASED’s guarantees when applied to our machine
model. Our formal system of choice is Linear Temporal Logic
(LTL). A background on LTL and our reasons for choosing it
are discussed in Section 2.
2 – Automatic end-to-end verification of complex systems such
as VRASED is challenging from the computability perspective,
as the space of possible states is extremely large. To cope with
this challenge, we take a “divide-to-conquer” approach. We
start by dividing the end-to-end goal of RA soundness and
security into smaller sub-properties that are also defined in
LTL. Each HW sub-module, responsible for enforcing a given
sub-property, is specified as a Finite State Machine (FSM),
and verified using a Model Checker. VRASED’s SW relies on
an F* verified implementation (see Section 4.3) which is also
specified in LTL. This modular approach allows us to efficiently
prove sub-properties enforced by individual building blocks in
VRASED.
3 – All proven sub-properties must be composed together in
order to reason about RA security and soundness of VRASED
as one whole system. To this end, we use a theorem prover
to show (by using LTL equivalences) that the sub-properties
that were proved for each of VRASED’s sub-modules, when
composed, imply the end-to-end definitions of RA soundness
and security. This modular approach enables efficient system-
wide formal verification.
1.1 The Scope of Low-End Devices
This work focuses on low-end devices based on low-power
single core microcontrollers with a few KBytes of program
and data memory. A representative of this class of devices is
the Texas Instrument’s MSP430 microcontroller (MCU) fam-
ily [25]. It has a 16-bit word size, resulting in ≈ 64 KBytes
of addressable memory. SRAM is used as data memory and
its size ranges between 4 and 16KBytes (depending on the
specific MSP430 model), while the rest of the address space is
used for program memory, e.g., ROM and Flash. MSP430 is a
Von Neumann architecture processor with common data and
code address spaces. It can perform multiple memory accesses
within a single instruction; its instruction execution time varies
from 1 to 6 clock cycles, and instruction length varies from 16
to 48 bits. MSP430 was designed for low-power and low-cost.
It is widely used in many application domains, e.g., automotive
industry, utility meters, as well as consumer devices and com-
puter peripherals. Our choice is also motivated by availability
of a well-maintained open-source MSP430 hardware design
from Open Cores [21]. Nevertheless, our machine model is ap-
plicable to other low-end MCUs in the same class as MSP430
(e.g., Atmel AVR ATMega).
1.2 Organization
Section 2 provides relevant background on RA and automated
verification. Section 3 contains the details of the VRASED archi-
tecture and an overview of the verification approach. Section 4
contains the formal definitions of end-to-endRA soundness and
security and the formalization of the necessary sub-properties
along with the implementation of verified components to re-
alize such sub-properties. Due to space limitation, the proofs
for end-to-end soundness and security derived from the sub-
properties are discussed in Appendix A. Section 5 discusses
alternative designs to guarantee the same required properties
and their trade-offs with the standard design. Section 6 presents
experimental results demonstrating the minimal overhead of
the formally verified and synthesized components. Section 7
discusses related work. Section 8 concludes with a summary
of our results. End-to-end proofs of soundness and security,
optional parts of the design, VRASED’s API, and discussion
on VRASED’s prototype can be found in Appendices A to D.
2 Background
This section overviews RA and provides some background on
computer-aided verification.
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2.1 RA for Low-end Devices
As mentioned earlier, RA is a security service that facilitates
detection of malware presence on a remote device. Specifi-
cally, it allows a trusted verifier (V rf) to remotely measure the
software state of an untrusted remote device (P rv). As shown
in Figure 1, RA is typically obtained via a simple challenge-
response protocol:
1. V rf sends an attestation request containing a challenge
(Chal) to P rv. This request might also contain a token
derived from a secret that allows P rv to authenticate V rf.
2. P rv receives the attestation request and computes an au-
thenticated integrity check over its memory and Chal. The
memory region might be either pre-defined, or explicitly
specified in the request. In the latter case, authentication
of V rf in step (1) is paramount to the overall security/pri-
vacy of P rv, as the request can specify arbitrary memory
regions.
3. P rv returns the result to V rf.
4. V rf receives the result from P rv, and checks whether it
corresponds to a valid memory state.
ProverVerifier
(2) Authenticated
Integrity Check
(4) Verify
Report
(1) Request
(3) Repor
t
Figure 1: Remote attestation (RA) protocol
The authenticated integrity check can be realized as a Mes-
sage Authentication Code (MAC) over P rv’s memory. How-
ever, computing a MAC requires P rv to have a unique secret
key (denoted by K ) shared with V rf. This K must reside in
secure storage, where it is not accessible to any software run-
ning on P rv, except for attestation code. Since most RA threat
models assume a fully compromised software state on P rv,
secure storage implies some level of hardware support.
Prior RA approaches can be divided into three groups:
software-based, hardware-based, and hybrid. Software-based
(or timing-based) RA is the only viable approach for legacy
devices with no hardware security features. Without hardware
support, it is (currently) impossible to guarantee that K is not
accessible by malware. Therefore, security of software-based
approaches [34, 43] is attained by setting threshold communi-
cation delays between V rf and P rv. Thus, software-based RA
is unsuitable for multi-hop and jitter-prone communication, or
settings where a compromised P rv is aided (during attestation)
by a more powerful accomplice device. It also requires strong
constraints and assumptions on the hardware platform and at-
testation usage [30, 33]. On the other extreme, hardware-based
approaches require either i) P rv’s attestation functionality to
be housed entirely within dedicated hardware, e.g., Trusted
Platform Modules (TPMs) [46]; or ii) modifications to the
CPU semantics or instruction sets to support the execution
of trusted software, e.g., SGX [26] or TrustZone [3]. Such
hardware features are too expensive (in terms of physical area,
energy consumption, and actual cost) for low-end devices.
While neither hardware- nor software-based approaches are
well-suited for settings where low-end devices communicate
over the Internet (which is often the case in the IoT), hybrid
RA (based on HW/SW co-design) is a more promising ap-
proach. Hybrid RA aims at providing the same security guar-
antees as hardware-based techniques with minimal hardware
support. SMART [20] is the first hybrid RA architecture target-
ing low-end MCUs. In SMART, attestation’s integrity check is
implemented in software. SMART’s small hardware footprint
guarantees that the attestation code runs safely and that the
attestation key is not leaked. HYDRA [19] is a hybrid RA
scheme that relies on a secure boot hardware feature and on
a secure micro-kernel. Trustlite [29] modifies Memory Pro-
tection Unit (MPU) and CPU exception engine hardware to
implement RA. Tytan [9] is built on top of Trustlite, extending
its capabilities for applications with real-time requirements.
Despite much progress, a major missing aspect in RA re-
search is high-assurance and rigor obtained by using formal
methods to guarantee security of a concrete RA design and
its implementation We believe that verifiability and formal
security guarantees are particularly important for hybrid RA
designs aimed at low-end embedded and IoT devices, as their
proliferation keeps growing. This serves as the main motiva-
tion for our efforts to develop the first formally verified RA
architecture.
2.2 Formal Verification, Model Checking &
Linear Temporal Logic
Computer-aided formal verification typically involves three ba-
sic steps. First, the system of interest (e.g., hardware, software,
communication protocol) must be described using a formal
model, e.g., a Finite State Machine (FSM). Second, properties
that the model should satisfy must be formally specified. Third,
the system model must be checked against formally specified
properties to guarantee that the system retains such properties.
This checking can be achieved via either Theorem Proving
or Model Checking. In this work, we use the latter and our
motivation for picking it is clarified below.
In Model Checking, properties are specified as formulae
using Temporal Logic and system models are represented as
FSMs. Hence, a system is represented by a triple (S,S0,T ),
where S is a finite set of states, S0 ⊆ S is the set of possible
initial states, and T ⊆ S× S is the transition relation set, i.e.,
it describes the set of states that can be reached in a single
step from each state. The use of Temporal Logic to specify
properties allows representation of expected system behavior
over time.
We apply the model checker NuSMV [17], which can be
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used to verify generic HW or SW models. For digital hardware
described at Register Transfer Level (RTL) – which is the
case in this work – conversion from Hardware Description
Language (HDL) to NuSMV model specification is simple.
Furthermore, it can be automated [27]. This is because the
standard RTL design already relies on describing hardware as
an FSM.
In NuSMV, properties are specified in Linear Temporal
Logic (LTL), which is particularly useful for verifying se-
quential systems. This is because it extends common logic
statements with temporal clauses. In addition to propositional
connectives, such as conjunction (∧), disjunction (∨), negation
(¬), and implication (→), LTL includes temporal connectives,
thus enabling sequential reasoning. We are interested in the
following temporal connectives:
• Xφ – neXt φ: holds if φ is true at the next system state.
• Fφ – Future φ: holds if there exists a future state where φ
is true.
• Gφ – Globally φ: holds if for all future states φ is true.
• φ U ψ – φ Until ψ: holds if there is a future state where ψ
holds and φ holds for all states prior to that.
This set of temporal connectives combined with propositional
connectives (with their usual meanings) allows us to specify
powerful rules. NuSMV works by checking LTL specifications
against the system FSM for all reachable states in such FSM.
In particular, all VRASED’s desired security sub-properties are
specified using LTL and verified by NuSMV.
3 Overview of VRASED
VRASED is composed of a HW module (HW-Mod) and a SW
implementation (SW-Att) of P rv’s behavior according to the
RA protocol. HW-Mod enforces access control to K in addition
to secure and atomic execution of SW-Att (these properties
are discussed in detail below). HW-Mod is designed with min-
imality in mind. The verified FSMs contain a minimal state
space, which keeps hardware cost low. SW-Att is responsible
for computing an attestation report. As VRASED’s security
properties are jointly enforced by HW-Mod and SW-Att, both
must be verified to ensure that the overall design conforms to
the system specification.
3.1 Adversarial Capabilities & Verification Ax-
ioms
We consider an adversary, A , that can control the entire soft-
ware state, code, and data of P rv. A can modify any writable
memory and read any memory that is not explicitly protected
by access control rules, i.e., it can read anything (including
secrets) that is not explicitly protected by HW-Mod. It can also
re-locate malware from one memory segment to another, in
order to hide it from being detected. A may also have full con-
trol over all Direct Memory Access (DMA) controllers on P rv.
DMA allows a hardware controller to directly access main
memory (e.g., RAM, flash or ROM) without going through the
CPU.
We focus on attestation functionality of P rv; verification of
the entire MCU architecture is beyond the scope of this paper.
Therefore, we assume the MCU architecture strictly adheres to,
and correctly implements, its specifications. In particular, our
verification approach relies on the following simple axioms:
• A1 - Program Counter: The program counter (PC) al-
ways contains the address of the instruction being exe-
cuted in a given cycle.
• A2 - Memory Address: Whenever memory is read or
written, a data-address signal (Daddr) contains the address
of the corresponding memory location. For a read access,
a data read-enable bit (Ren) must be set, and for a write
access, a data write-enable bit (Wen) must be set.
• A3 - DMA: Whenever a DMA controller attempts to
access main system memory, a DMA-address signal
(DMAaddr) reflects the address of the memory location
being accessed and a DMA-enable bit (DMAen) must be
set. DMA can not access memory when DMAen is off
(logical zero).
• A4 - MCU reset: At the end of a successful reset routine,
all registers (including PC) are set to zero before resuming
normal software execution flow. Resets are handled by
the MCU in hardware; thus, reset handling routine can
not be modified.
• A5 - Interrupts: When interrupts happen, the correspond-
ing irq signal is set.
Remark: Note that Axioms A1 to A5 are satisfied by the Open-
MSP430 design.
SW-Att uses the HACL* [51] HMAC-SHA256 function
which is implemented and verified in F*1. F* can be auto-
matically translated to C and the proof of correctness for
the translation is provided in [40]. However, even though ef-
forts have been made to build formally verified C compilers
(CompCert [32] is the most prominent example), there are
currently no verified compilers targeting lower-end MCUs,
such as MSP430. Hence, we assume that the standard compiler
can be trusted to semantically preserve its expected behavior,
especially with respect to the following:
• A6 - Callee-Saves-Register: Any register touched in a
function is cleaned by default when the function returns.
• A7 - Semantic Preservation: Functional correctness of
the verified HMAC implementation in C, when converted
to assembly, is semantically preserved.
Remark: Axioms A6 and A7 reflect the corresponding compiler
specification (e.g., msp430-gcc).
Physical hardware attacks are out of scope in this paper.
Specifically, A can not modify code stored in ROM, induce
hardware faults, or retrieve P rv secrets via physical presence
side-channels. Protection against physical attacks is consid-
1https://www.fstar-lang.org/
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Figure 2: Properties of secure RA.
ered orthogonal and could be supported via standard tamper-
resistance techniques [41].
3.2 High-Level Properties of Secure Attesta-
tion
We now describe, in high level, the sub-properties required for
RA. In section 4, we formalize these sub-properties in LTL
and provide single end-to-end definitions for RA soundness
and security. Then we prove that VRASED’s design satisfies
the aforementioned sub-properties and that the end-to-end
definitions for soundness and security are implied by them.
The properties, shown in Figure 2, fall into two groups: key
protection and safe execution.
Key Protection:
As mentioned earlier, K must not be accessible by regular
software running on P rv. To guarantee this, the following
features must be correctly implemented:
• P1- Access Control:K can only be accessed by SW-Att.
• P2- No Leakage: NeitherK (nor any function ofK other
than the correctly computed HMAC) can remain in un-
protected memory or registers after execution of SW-Att.
• P3- Secure Reset: Any memory tainted by K and
all registers (including PC) must be erased (or be
inaccessible to regular software) after MCU reset. Since
a reset might be triggered during SW-Att execution, lack
of this property could result in leakage of privileged
information about the system state or K . Erasure of
registers as part of the reset ensures that no state from a
previous execution persists. Therefore, the system must
return to the default initialization state.
Safe Execution:
Safe execution ensures that K is properly and securely used
by SW-Att for its intended purpose in the RA protocol. Safe
execution can be divided into four sub-properties:
• P4- Functional Correctness: SW-Att must implement
expected behavior of P rv’s role in the RA protocol. For
instance, if V rf expects a response containing an HMAC
of memory in address range [A,B], SW-Att implementa-
tion should always reply accordingly. Moreover, SW-Att
must always finish in finite time, regardless of input size
and other parameters.
MCU CORE
MEM.
BACK-
BONE
HW-Mod
SW-Att
K
SW-Att
STACK
(XS)
App.
Avail.
RAM
App.
Code
PC,
irq,
Ren,
Wen,
Daddr,
DMAen,
DMAaddr
reset
ROM
RAM
FLASH
Figure 3: VRASED system architecture
• P5- Immutability: SW-Att executable must be im-
mutable. Otherwise, malware residing in P rv could mod-
ify SW-Att, e.g., to always generate valid RA measure-
ments or to leak K .
• P6- Atomicity: SW-Att execution can not be interrupted.
The first reason for atomicity is to prevent leakage of
intermediate values in registers and SW-Att’s data mem-
ory (including locations that could leak functions of K )
during SW-Att execution. This relates to P2 above. The
second reason is to prevent roving malware from relocat-
ing itself to escape being measured by SW-Att.
• P7- Controlled Invocation: SW-Att must always start
from the first instruction and execute until the last instruc-
tion. Even though correct implementation of SW-Att is
guaranteed by P4, isolated execution of chunks of a cor-
rectly implemented code could lead to catastrophic results.
Potential ROP attacks could be constructed using gadgets
of SW-Att (which, based on P1, have access to K ) to
compute valid attestation results.
Beyond aforementioned core security properties, in some set-
tings, P rv might need to authenticate V rf’s attestation requests
in order to mitigate potential DoS attacks on P rv. This func-
tionality is also provided (and verified) as an optional feature in
the design of VRASED. The differences between the standard
design and the one with support for V rf authentication are
discussed in Appendix B.
3.3 System Architecture
VRASED architecture is depicted in Figure 3. VRASED is im-
plemented by adding HW-Mod to the MCU architecture, e.g.,
MSP430. MCU memory layout is extended to include Read-
Only Memory (ROM) that houses SW-Att code and K used
in the HMAC computation. Because K and SW-Att code
are stored in ROM, we have guaranteed immutability, i.e., P5.
VRASED also reserves a fixed part of the memory address space
for SW-Att stack. This amounts to ≈ 3% of the address space,
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as discussed in Section 6 2. Access control to dedicated mem-
ory regions, as well as SW-Att atomic execution are enforced
by HW-Mod. The memory backbone is extended to support mul-
tiplexing of the new memory regions. HW-Mod takes 7 input
signals from the MCU core: PC, irq, Daddr, Ren, Wen, DMAaddr
and DMAen. These inputs are used to determine a one-bit reset
signal output, that, when set to 1, resets the MCU core im-
mediately, i.e., before execution of the next instruction. The
reset output is triggered when HW-Mod detects any violation
of security properties 3.
3.4 Verification Approach
Figure 4: VRASED’s submodule verification
An overview of HW-Mod verification is shown in Figures 4
and 5. We start by formalizing RA sub-properties discussed in
this section using Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) to define in-
variants that must hold throughout the entire system execution.
HW-Mod is implemented as a composition of sub-modules writ-
ten in the Verilog hardware description language (HDL). Each
sub-module implements the hardware responsible for ensuring
a given subset of the LTL specifications. Each sub-module is
described as an FSM in: (1) Verilog at Register Transfer Level
(RTL); and (2) the Model-Checking language SMV [17]. We
then use the NuSMV model checker to verify that the FSM
complies with the LTL specifications. If verification fails, the
sub-module is re-designed.
Once each sub-module is verified, they are combined into a
single Verilog design. The composition is converted to SMV
using the automatic translation tool Verilog2SMV [27]. The
resulting SMV is simultaneously verified against all LTL spec-
ifications to prove that the final Verilog design for HW-Mod
complies with all secure RA properties.
We clarify that the individual SMV sub-modules’ design
and verification steps are not strictly required in the verifica-
tion pipeline. This is because verifying SMV that is automati-
cally translated from the composition of HW-Mod would suffice.
Nevertheless, we design FSMs in SMV first so as to facilitate
2A separate region in RAM is not strictly required. Alternatives and trade-
offs are discussed in Section 5
3Resets due to VRASED violations do not give malware advantages as mal-
ware can always trigger resets on the unmodified MCU by inducing software
faults.
sub-modules’ development and reasoning with an early addi-
tional check before going into their actual implementation and
composition in Verilog.
Remark: Automatic conversion of the composition of HW-Mod
from Verilog to SMV rules out the possibility of human
mistakes in representing Verilog FSMs as SMV.
For the SW-Att part of VRASED, we use the HMAC-SHA-
256 from the HACL* library [51] to compute an authenticated
intregrity check of attested memory and Chal received from
V rf. This function is formally verified with respect to mem-
ory safety, functional correctness, and cryptographic security.
However, key secrecy properties (such as clean-up of memory
tainted by the key) are not formally verified in HACL* and
thus must be ensured by HW-Mod.
As the last step, we prove that the conjunction of the LTL
properties guaranteed by HW-Mod and SW-Att implies sound-
ness and security of the RA architecture. These are formally
specified in Section 4.2.
Figure 5: Verification framework for the composition of sub-
modules (HW-Mod).
4 Verifying VRASED
In this section we formalize RA sub-properties. For each sub-
property, we represent it as a set of LTL specifications and
construct an FSM that is verified to conform to such specifica-
tions. Finally, the conjunction of these FSMs is implemented in
Verilog HDL and translated to SMV using Verilog2SMV. The
generated SMV description for the conjunction is proved to
simultaneously hold for all specifications. We also define end-
to-end soundness and security goals which are derived from
the verified sub-properties (See Appendix A for the proof).
4.1 Notation
To facilitate generic LTL specifications that represent
VRASED’s architecture (see Figure 3) we use the following:
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• ARmin and ARmax: first and last physical addresses of the
memory region to be attested;
• CRmin and CRmax: physical addresses of first and last in-
structions of SW-Att in ROM;
• Kmin and Kmax: first and last physical addresses of the ROM
region where K is stored;
• XSmin and XSmax: first and last physical addresses of the
RAM region reserved for SW-Att computation;
• MACaddr: fixed address that stores the result of SW-Att
computation (HMAC);
• MACsize: size of HMAC result;
Table 1 uses the above definitions and summarizes the notation
used in our LTL specifications throughout the rest of this paper.
To simplify specification of defined security properties, we
use [A,B] to denote a contiguous memory region between A
and B. Therefore, the following equivalence holds:
C ∈ [A,B]⇔ (C ≤ B∧C ≥ A) (1)
For example, expression PC ∈ CR holds when the current
value of PC signal is within CRmin and CRmax, meaning
that the MCU is currently executing an instruction in CR,
i.e, a SW-Att instruction. This is because in the notation
introduced above: PC ∈CR⇔ PC ∈ [CRmin,CRmax]⇔ (PC ≤
CRmax∧PC ≥CRmin).
FSM Representation. As discussed in Section 3, HW-Mod sub-
modules are represented as FSMs that are verified to hold for
LTL specifications. These FSMs correspond to the Verilog
hardware design of HW-Mod sub-modules. The FSMs are im-
plemented as Mealy machines, where output changes at any
time as a function of both the current state and current input val-
ues4. Each FSM has as inputs a subset of the following signals
and wires: {PC, irq, Ren,Wen, Daddr, DMAen, DMAaddr}.
Each FSM has only one output, reset, that indicates whether
any security property was violated. For the sake of presen-
tation, we do not explicitly represent the value of the reset
output for each state. Instead, we define the following implicit
representation:
1. reset output is 1 whenever an FSM transitions to the Reset
state;
2. reset output remains 1 until a transition leaving the Reset
state is triggered;
3. reset output is 0 in all other states.
4.2 Formalizing RA Soundness and Security
We now define the notions of soundness and security. Intu-
itively, RA soundness corresponds to computing an integrity
ensuring function over memory at time t. Our integrity ensur-
ing function is an HMAC computed on memory AR with a
one-time key derived from K and Chal. Since SW-Att com-
putation is not instantaneous, RA soundness must ensure that
4This is in contrast with Moore machines where the output is defined solely
based on the current state.
Table 1: Notation summary
Notation Description
PC Current Program Counter value
Ren Signal that indicates if the MCU is reading from memory (1-bit)
Wen Signal that indicates if the MCU is writing to memory (1-bit)
Daddr Address for an MCU memory access
DMAen Signal that indicates if DMA is currently enabled (1-bit)
DMAaddr Memory address being accessed by DMA, if any
CR (Code ROM) Memory region where SW-Att is stored:
CR = [CRmin,CRmax]
KR (K ROM) Memory region where K is stored: KR = [Kmin,Kmax]
XS (eXclusive Stack) secure RAM region reserved for SW-Att computations: XS =
[XSmin,XSmax]
MR (MAC RAM) RAM region in which SW-Att computation result is written: MR =
[MACaddr ,MACaddr +MACsize−1]. The same region is also used to pass the attestation chal-
lenge as input to SW-Att
AR (Attested Region) Memory region to be attested. Can be fixed/predefined or specified in an
authenticated request from V rf: AR = [ARmin,ARmax]
reset A 1-bit signal that reboots the MCU when set to logic 1
A1, A2, ..., A7 Verification axioms (outlined in section 3.1)
P1, P2, ..., P7 Properties required for secure RA (outlined in section 3.2)
attested memory does not change during computation of the
HMAC. This is the notion of temporal consistency in remote
attestation [14]. In other words, the result of SW-Att call must
reflect the entire state of the attested memory at the time when
SW-Att is called. This notion is captured in LTL by Defini-
tion 1.
Definition 1. End-to-end definition for soundness of RA computation
G : { PC =CRmin ∧AR = M∧MR = Chal ∧ [(¬reset) U (PC =CRmax)]→
F : [PC =CRmax ∧MR = HMAC(KDF(K ,Chal),M)] }
where M is any AR value and KDF is a secure key derivation function.
In Definition 1, PC=CRmin captures the time when SW-Att
is called (execution of its first instruction). M and Chal are
the values of AR and MR. From this pre-condition, Defini-
tion 1 asserts that there is a time in the future when SW-Att
computation finishes and, at that time, MR stores the result of
HMAC(KDF(K ,Chal),M). Note that, to satisfy Definition 1,
Chal and M in the resulting HMAC must correspond to the
values in AR and MR, respectively, when SW-Att was called.
RA security is defined using the security game in Figure 6.
It models an adversary A (that is a probabilistic polynomial
time, ppt, machine) that has full control of the software state
of P rv (as the one described in Section 3.1). It can modify
AR at will and call SW-Att a polynomial number of times in
the security parameter (K and Chal bit-lengths). However, A
can not modify SW-Att code, which is stored in immutable
memory. The game assumes that A does not have direct access
to K , and only learns Chal after it receives from V rf as part
of the attestation request.
In the following sections, we define SW-Att functional
correctness, LTL specifications 2-10 and formally verify that
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Definition 2.
2.1 RA Security Game (RA-game):
Assumptions:
- SW-Att is immutable, and K is not known to A
- l is the security parameter and |K |= |Chal|= |MR|= l
- AR(t) denotes the content in AR at time t
- A can modify AR and MR at will; however, it loses its ability to modify them
while SW-Att is running
RA-game:
1. Setup: A is given oracle access to SW-Att.
2. Challenge: A random challenge Chal← ${0,1}l is generated and
given to A . A continues to have oracle access to SW-Att.
3. Response: Eventually,A responds with a pair (M,σ), where σ is either
forged by A , or the result of calling SW-Att at some arbitrary time t.
4. A wins if and only if σ= HMAC(KDF(K ,Chal),M) and M 6= AR(t).
2.2 RA Security Definition:
An RA protocol is considered secure if there is no ppt A , polynomial in l, capable
of winning the game defined in 2.1 with Pr[A ,RA-game]> negl(l)
Figure 6: RA security definition for VRASED
VRASED’s design guarantees such LTL specifications. We de-
fine LTL specifications from the intuitive properties discussed
in Section 3.2 and depicted in Figure 2. In Appendix A we
prove that the conjunction of such properties achieves sound-
ness (Definition 1) and security (Definition 2). For the security
proof, we first show that VRASED guarantees that A can never
learn K with more than negligible probability, thus satisfying
the assumption in the security game. We then complete the
proof of security via reduction, i.e., show that existence of an
adversary that wins the game in Definition 2 implies the exis-
tence of an adversary that breaks the conjectured existential
unforgeability of HMAC.
Remark: The rest of this section focuses on conveying the intu-
ition behind the specification of LTL sub-properties. Therefore,
our references to the MCU machine model are via Axioms A1 -
A7 which were described in high level. The interested reader
can find an LTL machine model formalizing these notions in
Appendix A, where we describe how such machine model is
used construct computer proofs for Definitions 1 and 2.
4.3 VRASED SW-Att
To minimize required hardware features, hybridRA approaches
implement integrity ensuring functions (e.g., HMAC) in soft-
ware. VRASED’s SW-Att implementation is built on top of
HACL*’s HMAC implementation [51]. HACL* code is veri-
fied to be functionally correct, memory safe and secret indepen-
dent. In addition, all memory is allocated on the stack making
it predictable and deterministic.
SW-Att is simple, as depicted in Figure 7. It first derives
a new unique context-specific key (key) from the master key
(K ) by computing an HMAC-based key derivation function,
HKDF [31], on Chal. This key derivation can be extended to
incorporate attested memory boundaries if V rf specifies the
range (see Appendix B). Finally, it calls HACL*’s HMAC,
using key as the HMAC key. AT T EST _DATA_ADDR and
1 void Hacl_HMAC_SHA2_256_hmac_entry ( ) {
2 u i n t 8 _ t key [ 6 4 ] = { 0 } ;
3 memcpy ( key , ( u i n t 8 _ t * ) KEY_ADDR, 64) ;
4 hacl_hmac ( ( u i n t 8 _ t * ) key , ( u i n t 8 _ t * ) key , ( u i n t 3 2 _ t ) 64 , ( u i n t 8 _ t * )
CHALL_ADDR, ( u i n t 3 2 _ t ) 32) ;
5 hacl_hmac ( ( u i n t 8 _ t * ) MAC_ADDR, ( u i n t 8 _ t * ) key , ( u i n t 3 2 _ t ) 32 , ( u i n t 8 _ t * )
ATTEST_DATA_ADDR, ( u i n t 3 2 _ t ) ATTEST_SIZE ) ;
6 return ( ) ;
7 }
Figure 7: SW-Att C Implementation
AT T EST _SIZE specify the memory range to be attested (AR
in our notation). We emphasize that SW-Att resides in ROM,
which guarantees P5 under the assumption of no hardware
attacks. Moreover, as discussed below, HW-Mod enforces that
no other software running on P rv can access memory allocated
by SW-Att code, e.g., key[64] buffer allocated in line 2 of
Figure 7.
HACL*’s verified HMAC is the core for guaranteeing P4
(Functional Correctness) in VRASED’s design. SW-Att func-
tional correctness means that, as long as the memory regions
storing values used in SW-Att computation (CR, AR, and KR)
do not change during its computation, the result of such compu-
tation is the correct HMAC. This guarantee can be formally ex-
pressed in LTL as in Definition 3. We note that since HACL*’s
HMAC functional correctness is specified in F*, instead of
LTL, we manually convert its guarantees to the LTL expressed
by Definition 3. By this definition, the value in MR does not
need to remain the same, as it will eventually be overwritten
by the result of SW-Att computation.
Definition 3. SW-Att functional correctness
G : { PC =CRmin ∧MR = Chal ∧ [(¬reset ∧ ¬irq ∧ CR = SW-Att ∧ KR =K ∧ AR = M) U PC =CRmax ]
→ F : [PC =CRmax ∧MR = HMAC(KDF(K ,Chal),M)] }
where M is any arbitrary value for AR.
In addition, some HACL* properties, such as stack-based
and deterministic memory allocation, are used in alternative
designs of VRASED to ensure P2 – see Section 5.
Functional correctness implies that the HMAC implemen-
tation conforms to its published standard specification on all
possible inputs, retaining the specification’s cryptographic se-
curity. It also implies that HMAC executes in finite time. Secret
independence ensures that there are no branches taken as a
function of secrets, i.e., K and key in Figure 7. This mitigates
K leakage via timing side-channel attacks. Memory safety
guarantees that implemented code is type safe, meaning that
it never reads from, or writes to: invalid memory locations,
out-of-bounds memory, or unallocated memory. This is par-
ticularly important for preventing ROP attacks, as long as P7
(controlled invocation) is also preserved5.
5Otherwise, even though the implementation is memory-safe and correct
as a whole, chunks of a memory-safe code could still be used in ROP attacks.
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Run Reset
otherwise otherwise
¬(PC ∈CR) ∧Ren ∧ (Daddr ∈ KR)
PC = 0
Figure 8: Verified FSM for Key AC
Having all memory allocated on the stack allows us to either:
(1) confine SW-Att execution to a fixed size protected memory
region inaccessible to regular software (including malware)
running on P rv; or (2) ensure that SW-Att stack is erased be-
fore the end of execution. Note that HACL* does not provide
stack erasure, in order to improve performance. Therefore, P2
does not follow from HACL* implementation. However, era-
sure before SW-Att terminates must be guaranteed. Recall that
VRASED targets low-end MCUs that might run applications
on bare-metal and thus can not rely on any OS features.
As discussed above, even though HACL* implementation
guarantees P4 and storage in ROM guarantees P5, these must
be combined with P6 and P7 to provide safe execution. P6 and
P7 – along with the key protection properties (P1, P2, and P3)
– are ensured by HW-Mod, which are described next.
4.4 Key Access Control (HW-Mod)
If malware manages to read K from ROM, it can reply to V rf
with a forged result. HW-Mod access control (AC) sub-module
enforces that K can only be accessed by SW-Att (P1).
4.4.1 LTL Specification
The invariant for key access control (AC) is defined in LTL
Specification (2). It stipulates that system must transition to
the Reset state whenever code from outside CR tries to read
from Daddr within the key space.
G : {¬(PC ∈CR)∧Ren ∧ (Daddr ∈ KR)→ reset } (2)
4.4.2 Verified Model
Figure 8 shows the FSM implemented by the AC sub-module
which is verified to hold for LTL Specification 2. This FSM has
two states: Run and Reset. It outputs reset = 1 when the AC
sub-module transitions to state Reset. This implies a hard-reset
of the MCU. Once the reset process completes, the system
leaves the Reset state.
4.5 Atomicity and Controlled Invocation
(HW-Mod)
In addition to functional correctness, safe execution of attes-
tation code requires immutability (P5), atomicity (P6), and
controlled invocation (P7). P5 is achieved directly by placing
SW-Att in ROM. Therefore, we only need to formalize invari-
ants for the other two properties: atomicity and controlled
execution.
4.5.1 LTL Specification
To guarantee atomic execution and controlled invocation, LTL
Specifications (3), (4) and (5) must hold:
G : {[¬reset ∧ (PC ∈CR)∧¬(X(PC) ∈CR)]→ [PC =CRmax ∨X(reset)] } (3)
G : {[¬reset ∧¬(PC ∈CR)∧ (X(PC) ∈CR)]→ [X(PC) =CRmin ∨X(reset)] } (4)
G : {irq ∧ (PC ∈CR) → reset } (5)
LTL Specification (3) enforces that the only way for SW-Att
execution to terminate is through its last instruction: PC =
CRmax. This is specified by checking current and next PC val-
ues using LTL neXt operator. In particular, if current PC value
is within SW-Att region, and next PC value is out of SW-Att
region, then either current PC value is the address of the last
instruction in SW-Att (CRmax), or reset is triggered in the next
cycle. Also, LTL Specification (4) enforces that the only way
for PC to enter SW-Att region is through the very first in-
struction: CRmin. Together, these two invariants imply P7: it
is impossible to jump into the middle of SW-Att, or to leave
SW-Att before reaching the last instruction.
P6 is satisfied through LTL Specification (5). Atomicity
could be violated by interrupts. However, LTL Specification
(5) prevents an interrupt to happen while SW-Att is executing.
Therefore, if interrupts are not disabled by software running
on P rv before calling SW-Att, any interrupt that might violate
SW-Att atomicity will cause an MCU reset.
4.5.2 Verified Model
Figure 9 presents a verified model for atomicity and controlled
invocation enforcement. The FSM has five states. Two basic
states notCR and midCR represent moments when PC points
to an address: (1) outside CR, and (2) within CR, respectively,
not including the first and last instructions of SW-Att. Another
two: f stCR and lstCR represent states when PC points to the
first and last instructions of SW-Att, respectively. Note that
the only possible path from notCR to midCR is through f stCR.
Similarly, the only path from midCR to notCR is through lstCR.
The FSM transitions to the Reset state whenever: (1) any se-
quence of values for PC does not obey the aforementioned
conditions; or (2) irq is logical 1 while exeucuting SW-Att.
4.6 Key Confidentiality (HW-Mod)
To guarantee secrecy of K and thus satisfy P2, VRASED must
enforce the following:
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Reset
notCR
f stCR
midCR
lastCR
PC = 0
otherwise
PC <CRmin ∨ PC >CRmax
PC =CRmin∧¬ irq
otherwise
PC =CRmin
∧¬ irq
(PC >CRmin ∧ PC <CRmax)
∧¬ irq
otherwise
(PC >CRmin ∧ PC <CRmax)
∧¬ irq
PC =CRmax∧¬ irq
otherwise
PC =CRmax
∧¬ irq
(PC <CRmin ∨ PC >CRmax)
∧¬ irq
otherwise
Figure 9: Verified FSM for atomicity and controlled invocation.
1. No leaks after attestation: any registers and memory ac-
cessible to applications must be erased at the end of each
attestation instance, i.e., before application execution re-
sumes.
2. No leaks on reset: since a reset can be triggered during
attestation execution, any registers and memory accessible
to regular applications must be erased upon reset.
Per Axiom A4, all registers are zeroed out upon reset and at
boot time. Therefore, the only time when register clean-up is
necessary is at the end of SW-Att. Such clean-up is guaranteed
by the Callee-Saves-Register convention: Axiom A6.
Nonetheless, the leakage problem remains because of RAM
allocated by SW-Att. Thus, we must guarantee that K is not
leaked through "dead" memory, which could be accessed by
application (possibly, malware) after SW-Att terminates. A
simple and effective way of addressing this issue is by reserv-
ing a separate secure stack in RAM that is only accessible (i.e.,
readable and writable) by attestation code. All memory allo-
cations by SW-Att must be done on this stack, and access
control to the stack must be enforced by HW-Mod. As discussed
in Section 6, the size of this stack is constant – 2.3KBytes.
This corresponds to ≈ 3% of MSP430 16-bit address space.
We discuss VRASED variants that do not require a reserved
stack and trade-offs between them in Section 5.
4.6.1 LTL Specification
Recall that XS denote a contiguous secure memory region
reserved for exclusive access by SW-Att. LTL Specification
for the secure stack sub-module is as follows:
G : {¬(PC ∈CR)∧ (Ren ∨Wen)∧ (Daddr ∈ XS)→ reset } (6)
We also want to prevent attestation code from writing into
application memory. Therefore, it is only allowed to write to
the designated fixed region for the HMAC result (MR).
G : {(PC ∈CR)∧ (Wen)∧¬(Daddr ∈ XS)∧¬(Daddr ∈MR)→ reset } (7)
Run Reset
otherwise otherwise
(¬(PC ∈CR)∧ (Ren∨Wen)∧ (Daddr ∈ XS))
∨
((PC ∈CR)∧ (Wen)∧¬(Daddr ∈ XS)∧¬(Daddr ∈MR))
PC = 0
Figure 10: Verified FSM for Key Confidentiality
In summary, invariants (6) and (7) enforce that only attestation
code can read from/write to the secure reserved stack and that
attestation code can only write to regular memory within the
space reserved for the HMAC result. If any of these conditions
is violated, the system resets.
4.6.2 Verified Model
Figure 10 shows the FSM verified to comply with invariants (6)
and (7).
4.7 DMA Support
So far, we presented a formalization of HW-Mod sub-modules
under the assumption that DMA is either not present or disabled
on P rv. However, when present, a DMA controller can access
arbitrary memory regions. Such memory access is performed
concurrently in the memory backbone and without MCU inter-
vention, while the MCU executes regular instructions.
DMA data transfer is performed using dedicated memory
buses, e.g., DMAen and DMAaddr. Hence, regular memory ac-
cess control (based on monitoring Daddr) does not apply to
memory access by DMA controller. Thus, if DMA controller is
compromised, it may lead to violation of P1 and P2 by directly
reading K and values in the attestation stack, respectively. In
addition, it can assist P rv-resident malware to escape detection
by either copying it out of the measurement range or deleting
it, which results in a violation of P6.
4.7.1 LTL Specification
We introduce three additional LTL Specifications to protect
against aforementioned attacks. First, we enforce that DMA
cannot access K .
G : {DMAen ∧ (DMAaddr ∈ KR)→ reset } (8)
Similarly, LTL Specification for preventing DMA access to the
attestation stack is defined as:
G : {DMAen ∧ (DMAaddr ∈ XS)→ reset } (9)
Finally, invariant (10) specifies that DMA must be always
disabled while PC is in SW-Att region. This prevents DMA
controller from helping malware escape during attestation.
G : {(PC ∈CR)∧DMAen→ reset } (10)
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4.7.2 Verified Model
Figure 11 shows the FSM verified to comply with invariants (8)
to (10).
Run Reset
otherwise otherwise
(DMAen∧ (DMAaddr ∈ KR))
∨
((PC ∈CR)∧DMAen)
∨
(DMAen∧ (DMAaddr ∈ XS))→ reset;
PC = 0
Figure 11: Verified FSM for DMA protection
4.8 HW-Mod Composition
Thus far, we designed and verified individual HW-Mod sub-
modules according to the methodology in Section 3.4 and
illustrated in Figure 4. We now follow the workflow of Fig-
ure 5 to combine the sub-modules into a single Verilog module.
Since each sub-module individually guarantees a subset of
properties P1–P7, the composition is simple: the system must
reset whenever any sub-module reset is triggered. This is im-
plemented by a logical OR of sub-modules reset signals. The
composition is shown in Figure 12.
To verify that all LTL specifications still hold for the compo-
sition, we use Verilog2SMV [27] to translate HW-Mod to SMV
and verify SMV for all of these specifications simultaneously.
4.9 Secure Reset (HW-Mod)
Finally, we define an LTL Specification for secure reset (P3).
According to Axiom A4, all registers (including PC) are set
to 0 on reset. However, the reset routine implemented by the
MCU might take several clock cycles. Ensuring that reset = 1
until the point when registers are wiped is important in order
to guarantee that K is not leaked through registers after a reset.
Figure 12: HW-Mod composition from sub-modules
That is because some part of K might remain in some of the
registers if a reset happens during SW-Att execution.
4.9.1 LTL Specification
To guarantee that the reset signal is active for long enough so
that the MCU reset finishes and all registers are cleaned-up, it
must hold that:
G : {reset→ [(reset U PC = 0) ∨ G(reset)] } (11)
Invariant (11) states: when reset signal is triggered, it can only
be released after PC = 0. Transition from Reset state in all sub-
modules presented in this section already takes this invariant
into account. Thus, HW-Mod composition also verifies LTL
Specification (11).
5 Alternative Designs
We now discuss alternative designs for VRASED that guarantee
verified properties without requiring a separate secure stack
region for SW-Att operations. Recall that HW-Mod enforces
that only SW-Att can access this stack. Since memory usage
in HACL* HMAC is deterministic, the size of the separate
stack can be pre-determined – 2,332bytes. Even though re-
sulting in overall (HW and SW) design simplicity, dedicating
3% of addressable memory to secure RA might not be desir-
able. Therefore, we consider several alternatives. In Section 6
the costs involved with these alternatives are quantified and
compared to the standard design of VRASED.
5.1 Erasure on SW-Att
The most intuitive alternative to a reserved secure stack (which
prevents accidental key leakage by SW-Att) is to encode cor-
responding properties into the HACL* implementation and
proof. Specifically, it would require extending the HACL* im-
plementation to zero out all allocated memory before every
function return. In addition, to retain verification of P2 (in
Section 3.2) and ensure no leakage, HACL*-verified proper-
ties must be extended to incorporate memory erasure. This
is not yet supported in HACL* and doing so would incur a
slight performance overhead. However, the trade-off between
performance and RAM savings might be worthwhile.
At the same time, we note that, even with verified erasure
as a part of SW-Att, P2 is still not guaranteed if the MCU
does not guarantee erasure of the entire RAM upon boot. This
is necessary in order to consider the case when P rv re-boots
in the middle of SW-Att execution. Without a reserved stack,
K might persist in RAM. Since the memory range for SW-Att
execution is not fixed, hardware support is required to bootstrap
secure RAM erasure before starting any software execution. In
fact, such support is necessary for all approaches without a
separate secure stack.
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5.2 Compiler-Based Clean-Up
While stack erasure in HACL* would integrate nicely with
the overall proof of SW-Att, the assurance would be at the
language abstraction level, and not necessarily at the machine
level. The latter would require additional assumptions about
the compilation tool chain. We could also consider performing
stack erasure directly in the compiler. In fact, a recent proposal
to do exactly that was made in zerostack [44], an extension
to Clang/LLVM. In case of VRASED, this feature could be
used on unmodified HACL* (at compilation time), to add in-
structions to erase the stack before the return of each function
enabling P2, assuming the existence of a verified RAM erasure
routine upon boot. We emphasize that this approach may in-
crease the compiler’s trusted code base. Ideally, it should be
implemented and formally verified as part of a verified com-
piler suite, such as CompCert [32].
5.3 Double-HMAC Call
Finally, complete stack erasure could also be achieved directly
using currently verified HACL* properties, without any fur-
ther modifications. This approach involves invoking HACL*
HMAC function a second time, after the computation of the
actual HMAC. The second "dummy" call would use the same
input data, however, instead of using K , an independent con-
stant, such as {0}512, would be used as the HMAC key.
Recall that HACL* is verified to only allocate memory on
the stack in a deterministic manner. Also, due to HACL*’s
verified properties that mitigate side-channels, software flow
does not change based on the secret key. Therefore, this de-
terministic allocation implies that, for inputs of the same size,
any variable allocated by the first "real" HMAC call (tainted by
K ), would be overwritten by the corresponding variable in the
second "dummy" call. Note that the same guarantee discussed
in Section 5.1 is provided here and secure RAM erasure at boot
would still be needed for the same reasons. Admittedly, this
double-HMAC approach would consume twice as many CPU
cycles. Still, it might be a worthwhile trade-off, especially, if
there is memory shortage and lack of previously discussed
HACL* or compiler extension.
6 Evaluation
We now discuss implementation details and evaluate
VRASED’s overhead and performance. Section 6.2 reports on
verification complexity. Section 6.3 discusses performance in
terms of time and space complexity as well as its hardware
overhead. We also provide a comparison between VRASED
and other RA architectures targeting low-end devices, namely
6As mentioned in Section 5.2, there is no formally verified msp430 com-
piler capable of performing stack erasure. Thus, we estimate overhead of
this approach by manually inserting code required for erasing the stack in
SW-Att.
SANCUS [37] and SMART [20], in Section 6.4.
6.1 Implementation
As mentioned earlier, we use OpenMSP430 [21] as an open
core implementation of the MSP430 architecture. Open-
MSP430 is written in the Verilog hardware description lan-
guage (HDL) and can execute software generated by any
MSP430 toolchain with near cycle accuracy. We modified
the standard OpenMSP430 to implement the hardware archi-
tecture presented in Section 3.3, as shown in Figure 3. This
includes adding ROM to store K and SW-Att, adding HW-Mod,
and adapting the memory backbone accordingly. We use Xilinx
Vivado [49] – a popular logic synthesis tool – to synthesize
an RTL description of HW-Mod into hardware in FPGA. FPGA
synthesized hardware consists of a number of logic cells. Each
consists of Look-Up Tables (LUTs) and registers; LUTs are
used to implement combinatorial boolean logic while registers
are used for sequential logic elements, i.e., FSM states and
data storage. We compiled SW-Att using the native msp430-
gcc [45] and used Linker scripts to generate software images
compatible with the memory layout of Figure 3. Finally, we
evaluated VRASED on the FPGA platform targeting Artix-
7 [50] class of devices.
6.2 Verification Results
As discussed in Section 3.2, VRASED’s verification consists
of properties P1–P7. P5 is achieved directly by executing
SW-Att from ROM. Meanwhile, HACL* HMAC verification
implies P4. All other properties are automatically verified us-
ing NuSMV model checker. Table 3 shows the verification
results of VRASED’s HW-Mod composition as well as results
for individual sub-modules. It shows that VRASED success-
fully achieves all the required security properties. These results
also demonstrate feasibility of our verification approach, since
the verification process – running on a commodity desktop
computer – consumes only small amount of memory and time:
< 14MB and 0.3sec, respectively, for all properties.
6.3 Performance and Hardware Cost
We now report on VRASED’s performance considering the stan-
dard design (described in Section 4) and alternatives discussed
in Section 5. We evaluate the hardware footprint, memory
(ROM and secure RAM), and run-time. Table 2 summarizes the
results.
Hardware Footprint. The secure stack approach adds around
434 lines of code in Verilog HDL. This corresponds to around
20% of the code in the original OpenMSP430 core. In terms of
synthesized hardware, it requires 122 (6.6%) and 19 (5.4%) ad-
ditional LUTs and registers respectively. Overall, VRASED con-
tains 193 logic cells more than the unmodified OpenMSP430
core, corresponding to a 6.3% increase.
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Table 2: Evaluation of cost, overhead, and performance of RA
Method RAM ErasureRequired Upon Boot?
FPGA Hardware Verilog
LoC
Memory (byte) Time to attest 4KB
LUT Reg Cell ROM Sec. RAM CPU cycles ms (at 8MHz)
Core (Baseline) N/A 1842 684 3044 4034 0 0 N/A N/A
Secure Stack (Section 4) No 1964 721 3237 4621 4500 2332 3601216 450.15
Erasure on SW-Att (Section 5.1) Yes 1954 717 3220 4516 4522 0 3613283 451.66
Compiler-based Clean-up (Section 5.2) 6 Yes 1954 717 3220 4516 4522 0 3613283 451.66
Double-HMAC Call (Section 5.3) Yes 1954 717 3220 4516 4570 0 7201605 900.20
Table 3: Verification results running on a desktop @ 3.40 GHz.
HW Submod. LTL Spec. Mem. (MB) Time (s) Verified
Key AC 2,11 7.5 .02 3
Atomicity 3,4,5,11 8.5 .05 3
Exclusive Stack 6,7,11 8.1 .03 3
DMA Support 8-11 8.2 .04 3
HW-Mod 2-11 13.6 .28 3
Memory. VRASED requires ∼4.5KB of ROM; most of which
(96%) is for storing HACL* HMAC-SHA256 code. The se-
cure stack approach has the smallest ROM size, as it does not
need to perform a memory clean-up in software. However, this
advantage is attained at the price of requiring 2.3KBytes of
reserved RAM. This overhead corresponds to 3.5% of MSP430
16-bit address space.
Attestation Run-time. Attestation run-time is dominated by
the time it takes to compute the HMAC of P rv’s memory. The
secure stack, erasure on SW-Att and compiler-based clean-
up approaches take roughly .45s to attest 4KB of RAM on an
MSP430 device with a clock frequency at 8MHz. Whereas, the
double MAC approach requires invoking the HMAC function
twice, leading its run-time to be roughly two times slower.
Discussion. We consider VRASED’s overhead to be affordable.
The additional hardware, including registers, logic gates and ex-
clusive memory, resulted in only a 3-6% increase. The number
of cycles required by SW-Att exhibits a linear increase with
the size of attested memory. As MSP430 typically runs at 8-
25MHz, attestation of the entire RAM on a typical MSP430 can
be computed in less than a second. VRASED’s RA is relatively
cheap to the P rv. As a point of comparison we can consider
a common cryptographic primitive such as the Curve25519
Elliptic-Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key exchange. A single
execution of an optimized version of such protocol on MSP430
has been reported to take ≈ 9 million cycles [23]. As Table 2
shows, attestation of 4KBytes (typical size of RAM in some
MSP430 models) can be computed three times faster.
6.4 Comparison with Other Low-End RA Ar-
chitectures
We here compare VRASED’s overhead with two widely
known RA architectures targeting low-end embedded systems:
SMART [20] and SANCUS [37]. We emphasize, however,
that both SMART and SANCUS were designed in an ad hoc
manner. Thus, they can not be formally verified and do not pro-
vide any guarantees offered by VRASED’s verified architecture.
Table 4: Qualitative comparison between RA architectures
targeting low-end devices
VRASED SMART SANCUS
Design Type Hybrid (HW/SW) Hybrid (HW/SW) Pure HW
RA function HMAC-SHA256 HMAC-SHA1 SPONGNET-128/128/8
ROM for RA code Yes Yes No
DMA Support Yes No No
Formally Verified Yes No No
Nevertheless, it is considered important to contrast VRASED’s
cost with such architectures to demonstrate its affordability.
Table 4 presents a comparison between features offered and
required by aforementioned architectures. SANCUS is, to the
best of our knowledge, the cheapest pure HW-based architec-
ture, while SMART is a minimal HW/SW RA co-design. Since
SANCUS’s RA routine is implemented entirely in HW, it does
not require ROM to store the SW implementation of the in-
tegrity ensuring function. VRASED implements a MAC with
digest sizes of 256-bits. SMART and SANCUS, on the other
hand, use SHA1-based MAC and SPONGNET-128/128/8 [7],
respectively. Such MACs do not offer strong collision resis-
tance due to the small digest sizes (and known collisions). Of
the three architectures, VRASED is the only one secure in the
presence of DMA and the only one to be rigorously specified
and formally verified.
Figure 13 presents a quantitative comparison between the
RA architectures. It considers additional overhead in relation to
the latest version of the unmodified OpenMSP430 (Available
at [21]). Compared to VRASED, SANCUS requires 12× more
Look-Up Tables, 22× more registers, and its (unverified) TCB
is 2.5 times larger in lines of Verilog code. This comparison
demonstrates the cost of relying on a HW-only approach even
when designed for minimality. SMART’s overhead is slightly
smaller than that of VRASED due to lack of DMA support. In
terms of attestation execution time, SMART is the slowest, re-
quiring 9.2M clock cycles to attest 4KB of memory. SANCUS
achieves the fastest attestation time (1.3M cycles) due to the
HW implementation of SPONGNET-128/128/8. VRASED sits
in between the two with a total attestation time of 3.6M cycles.
7 Related Work
We are unaware of any previous work that yielded a formally
verified RA design (RA architectures are overviewed in Sec-
tion 2.1). To the best of our knowledge, VRASED is the first
verification of a security service implemented as HW/SW co-
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Figure 13: Comparison between RA architectures targeting
low-end devices
design. Nevertheless, formal verification has been widely used
as the de facto means to guarantee that a system is free of
implementation errors and bugs. In recent years, several efforts
focused on verifying security-critical systems.
In terms of cryptographic primitives, Hawblitzel et al. [22]
verified new implementations of SHA, HMAC, and RSA.
Beringer et al. [4] verified the Open-SSL SHA-256 implemen-
tation. Bond et al. [8] verified an assembly implementation of
SHA-256, Poly1305, AES and ECDSA. More recently, Zinzin-
dohoué, et al. [51] developed HACL*, a verified cryptographic
library containing the entire cryptographic API of NaCl [5].
As discussed earlier, HACL*’s verified HMAC forms the core
of VRASED’s software component.
Larger security-critical systems have also been successfully
verified. For example, Bhargavan [6] implemented the TLS
protocol with verified cryptographic security. CompCert [32]
is a C compiler that is formally verified to preserve C code se-
mantics in generated assembly code. Klein et al. [28] designed
and proved functional correctness of seL4 – the first veri-
fied general-purpose microkernel. More recently, Tuncay et al.
verified a design for Android OS App permissions model [47].
The importance of verifying RA has been recently acknowl-
edged by Lugou et al. [35], which discussed methodologies
for specifically verifying HW/SW RA co-designs. A follow-on
result proposed the SMASH-UP tool [36]. By modeling a hard-
ware abstraction, SMASH-UP allows automatic conversion of
assembly instructions to the effects on hardware representa-
tion. Similarly, Cabodi et al. [11, 12] discussed the first steps
towards formalizing hybrid RA properties. However, none of
these results yielded a fully verified (and publicly available)
RA architecture, such as VRASED.
8 Conclusion
This paper presents VRASED – the first formally verified RA
method that uses a verified cryptographic software implementa-
tion and combines it with a verified hardware design to guaran-
tee correct implementation of RA security properties. VRASED
is also the first verified security service implemented as a
HW/SW co-design. VRASED was designed with simplicity
and minimality in mind. It results in efficient computation
and low hardware cost, realistic even for low-end embedded
systems. VRASED’s practicality is demonstrated via publicly
available implementation using the low-end MSP430 platform.
The design and verification methodology presented in this pa-
per can be extended to other MCU architectures. We believe
that this work represents an important and timely advance in
embedded systems security, especially, with the rise of hetero-
geneous ecosystems of (inter-)connected IoT devices.
The most natural direction for future work is to adapt
VRASED to other MCU architectures. Such an effort could
follow the same verification methodology presented in this
paper. It would involve: (1) mapping MCUs specifications to
a set of axioms (as we did for MSP430 in Section 3), and (2)
adapting the proofs by modifying the LTL Specifications and
hardware design (as in in Section 4) accordingly. A second
direction is to extend VRASED’s capabilities to include and
verify other trusted computing services such as secure updates,
secure deletion, and remote code execution. It would also be
interesting to verify and implement other RA designs with
different requirements and trade-offs, such as software- and
hardware-based techniques. In the same vein, one promising
direction would be to verify HYDRA RA architecture [19],
which builds on top of the formally verified seL4 [28] micro-
kernel. Finally, the optimization of VRASED’s HMAC, with
respect to computation and memory allocation, while retaining
its verified properties, is an interesting open problem.
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APPENDIX
A RA Soundness and Security Proofs
A.1 Proof Strategy
We present the proofs for RA soundness (Definition 1) and RA
security (Definition 2). Soundness is proved entirely via LTL
equivalences. In the proof of security we first show, via LTL
equivalences, that VRASED guarantees that adversary A can
never learn K with more than negligible probability. We then
prove security by showing a reduction from HMAC existential
unforgeability to security. In other words, we show that exis-
tence of A that breaks VRASED implies existence of HMAC-A
able to break conjectured existential unforgeability of HMAC.
The full machine-checked proofs for the LTL equivalences
(using Spot 2.0 [18] proof assistant) discussed in the remainder
of this section are available in [1].
A.2 Machine Model
To prove that VRASED’s design satisfies end-to-end definitions
of soundness and security for RA, we start by formally defining
(in LTL) memory and execution models corresponding to the
architecture introduced in Section 3.
Definition 4 (Memory model).
1. K is stored in ROM↔ G : {KR =K }
2. SW-Att is stored in ROM↔ G : {CR = SW-Att}
3. MR, CR, AR, KR, and XS are non-overlapping memory regions
The memory model in Definition 4 captures that KR and CR
are ROM regions, and are thus immutable. Hence, the values
stored in those regions always correspond to K and SW-Att
code, respectively. Finally, the memory model states that MR,
CR, AR, KR, and XS are disjoint regions in the memory layout,
corresponding to the architecture in Figure 3.
Definition 5 (Execution model).
1. Modify_Mem(i)→ (Wen ∧Daddr = i)∨ (DMAen ∧DMAaddr = i)
2. Read_Mem(i)→ (Ren ∧Daddr = i)∨ (DMAen ∧DMAaddr = i)
3. Interrupt→ irq
Our execution model, in Definition 5, translates MSP430
behavior by capturing the effects on the processor signals when
reading and writing from/to memory. We do not model the
effects of instructions that only modify register values (e.g.,
ALU operations, such as add and mul) because they are not
necessary in our proofs.
The execution model defines that a given memory address
can be modified in two cases: by a CPU instruction or by
DMA. In the first case, the Wen signal must be on and Daddr
must contain the memory address being accessed. In the second
case, DMAen signal must be on and DMAaddr must contain the
address being modified by DMA. The requirements for reading
from a given address are similar, except that instead of Wen,
Ren must be on. Finally, the execution model also captures the
fact that an interrupt implies setting the irq signal to 1.
A.3 RA Soundness Proof
The proof follows from SW-Att functional correctness (ex-
pressed by Definition 3) and LTL specifications 3, 5, 7, and
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Theorem 1. VRASED is sound according to Definition 1.
Proof.
De f inition 3 ∧ LT L3 ∧LT L5 ∧LT L7 ∧LT L10→ T heorem 1
The formal computer proof for Theorem 1 can be found
in [1]. Due to space limitations, we only provide some intu-
ition, by splitting the proof into two parts. First, SW-Att func-
tional correctness (Definition 3) would imply Theorem 1 if AR,
CR, KR never change and an interrupt does not happen during
SW-Att computation. However, memory model Definitions 4.1
and 4.2 already guarantee that CR and KR never change. Also,
LTL 5 states that an interrupt cannot happen during SW-Att
computation, otherwise the device resets. Therefore, it remains
for us to show that AR does not change during SW-Att com-
putation. This is stated in Lemma 1.
In turn, Lemma 1 can be proved by:
LT L3 ∧LT L7 ∧LT L10→ Lemma 1 (12)
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Lemma 1. Temporal Consistency – Attested memory does not change during
SW-Att computation
G : {
PC =CRmin ∧AR = M∧¬reset U (PC =CRmax)→
(AR = M) U (PC =CRmax) }
The reasoning for Equation 12 is as follows:
• LT L3 prevents the CPU from stopping execution of
SW-Att before its last instruction.
• LT L7 guarantees that the only memory regions written by
the CPU during SW-Att execution are XS and MR, which
do not overlap with AR.
• LT L10 prevents DMA from writing to memory during
SW-Att execution.
Therefore, there are no means for modifying AR during
SW-Att execution, implying Lemma 1. As discussed above, it
is easy to see that:
Lemma 1∧LT L5 ∧De f inition 3→ T heorem 1 (13)
A.4 RA Security Proof
Recall the definition of RA security in the game in Figure 6.
The game makes two key assumptions:
1. SW-Att call results in a temporally consistent HMAC of
AR using a key derived from K and Chal. This is already
proved by VRASED’s soundness.
2. A never learns K with more than negligible probability.
Lemma 2. Key confidentiality – K can not be accessed directly by untrusted
software (¬(PC ∈CR)) and any memory written to by SW-Att can never be read
by untrusted software.
G : {
(¬(PC ∈CR)∧Read_Mem(i)∧ i ∈ KR→ reset)∧
(DMAen ∧DMAaddr = i∧ i ∈ KR→ reset)∧
[¬reset ∧PC ∈CR∧Modi f y_Mem(i)∧¬(i ∈MR)→
G : {(¬(PC ∈CR)∧Read_Mem(i)∨DMAen ∧DMAaddr = i)
→ reset}]
}
By proving that VRASED’s design satisfies assumptions 1 and
2, we show that the capabilities of untrusted software (any
DMA or CPU software other than SW-Att) on P rv are equiv-
alent to the capabilities of A in RA-game. Therefore, we still
need to prove item 2 before we can use such game to prove
VRASED’s security. The proof of A’s inability to learn K with
more than negligible probability is facilitated by A6 - Callee-
Saves-Register convention stated in Section 3. A6 directly
implies no leakage of information through registers on the re-
turn of SW-Att. This is because, before the return of a function,
registers must be restored to their state prior to the function call.
Thus, untrusted software can only learn K (or any function
of K ) through memory. However, if untrusted software can
never read memory written by SW-Att, it never learns anything
about K (not even through timing side channels since SW-Att
is secret independent). Now, it suffices to prove that untrusted
software can not access K directly and that it can never read
memory written by SW-Att. These conditions are stated in
LTL in Lemma 2. We prove that VRASED satisfies Lemma 2
by writing a computer proof (available in [1]) for Equation 14.
The reasoning for this proof is similar to that of RA soundness
and omitted due to space constraints.
LT L2 ∧LT L6 ∧LT L7 ∧LT L8 ∧LT L9 ∧LT L10→ Lemma 2 (14)
We emphasize that Lemma 2 does not restrict reads and writes
to MR, since this memory is used for inputting Chal and re-
ceiving SW-Att result. Nonetheless, the already proved RA
soundness and LTL 4 (which makes it impossible to execute
fractions of SW-Att) guarantee that MR will not leak anything,
because at the end of SW-Att computation it will always con-
tain an HMAC result, which does not leak information aboutK .
After proving Lemma 2, the capabilities of untrusted software
on P rv are equivalent to those of adversary A in RA-game of
Definition 2. Therefore, in order to prove VRASED’s security,
it remains to show a reduction from HMAC security according
to the game in Definition 2. VRASED’s security is stated and
proved in Theorem 2.
Theorem 2. VRASED is secure according to Definition 2 as
long as HMAC is a secure MAC.
Proof. A MAC is defined as tuple of algorithms
{Gen,Mac,Vrf}. For the reduction we construct a
slightly modified HMAC′, which has the same Mac and Vrf
algorithms as standard HMAC but Gen← KDF(K ,Chal)
where Chal← ${0,1}l . Since KDF function itself is imple-
mented as a Mac call, it is easy to see that the outputs of
Gen are indistinguishable from random. In other words, the
security of this slightly modified construction follows from the
security of HMAC itself. Assuming that there exists A such
that Pr[A ,RAgame] > negl(l), we show that such adversary
can be used to construct HMAC-A that breaks existential
unforgeability of HMAC’ with probability Pr[HMAC-A ,MAC-
game] > negl(l). To that purpose HMAC-A behaves as
follows:
1. HMAC-A selects msg to be the same M 6= AR as in RA-
game and asks A to produce the same output used to win
RA-game.
2. HMAC-A outputs the pair (msg,σ) as a response for the
challenge in the standard existential unforgeability game,
where σ is the output produced by A in step 1.
By construction, (msg,σ) is a valid response to a challenge in
the existential unforgeability MAC game considering HMAC′
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as defined above. Therefore, HMAC-A is able to win the exis-
tential unforgeability game with the same > negl(l) probability
that A has of winning RA-game in Definition 2.
B Optional Verifier Authentication
1 void Hacl_HMAC_SHA2_256_hmac_entry ( ) {
2 u i n t 8 _ t key [ 6 4 ] = { 0 } ;
3 u i n t 8 _ t v e r i f i c a t i o n [ 3 2 ] = { 0 } ;
4 if (memcmp(CHALL_ADDR, CTR_ADDR, 32) > 0)
5 {
6 memcpy ( key , KEY_ADDR, 64) ;
7
8 hacl_hmac ( ( u i n t 8 _ t * ) v e r i f i c a t i o n , ( u i n t 8 _ t * ) key ,
9 ( u i n t 3 2 _ t ) 64 , * ( ( u i n t 8 _ t * )CHALL_ADDR) ,
10 ( u i n t 3 2 _ t ) 32) ;
11
12 if ( ! memcmp(VRF_AUTH, v e r i f i c a t i o n , 32)
13 {
14 hacl_hmac ( ( u i n t 8 _ t * ) key , ( u i n t 8 _ t * ) key ,
15 ( u i n t 3 2 _ t ) 64 , ( u i n t 8 _ t * ) v e r i f i c a t i o n ,
16 ( u i n t 3 2 _ t ) 32) ;
17 hacl_hmac ( ( u i n t 8 _ t * ) MAC_ADDR, ( u i n t 8 _ t * ) key ,
18 ( u i n t 3 2 _ t ) 32 , ( u i n t 8 _ t * ) ATTEST_DATA_ADDR,
19 ( u i n t 3 2 _ t ) ATTEST_SIZE ) ;
20 memcpy (CTR_ADDR, CHALL_ADDR, 32) ;
21 }
22 }
23
24 return ( ) ;
25 }
Figure 14: SW-Att Implementation with V rf authentication
Depending on the setting where P rv is deployed, authenti-
cating the attestation request before executing SW-Att may
be required. For example, if P rv is in a public network, the
adversary may try to communicate with it. In particular, the
adversary can impersonate V rf and send fake attestation re-
quests to P rv, attempting to cause denial-of-service. This is
particularly relevant if P rv is a safety-critical device. If P rv re-
ceives too many attestation requests, regular (and likely honest)
software running on P rv would not execute because SW-Att
would run all the time. Thus, we now discuss an optional part
of VRASED’s design suitable for such settings. It supports
and formally verifies authentication of V rf as part of SW-Att
execution. Our implementation is based on the protocol in [10].
Figure 14 presents an implementation of SW-Att that in-
cludes V rf authentication. It also builds upon HACL* ver-
ified HMAC to authenticate V rf, in addition to computing
the authenticated integrity check. In this case, V rf’s request
additionally contains an HMAC of the challenge computed
using K . Before calling SW-Att, software running on P rv is
expected to store the received challenge on a fixed address
CHALL_ADDR and the corresponding received HMAC on
V RF_AUT H. SW-Att discards the attestation request if (1)
the received challenge is less than or equal to the latest chal-
lenge, or (2) HMAC of the received challenge is mismatched.
After that, it derives a new unique key using HKDF [31] from
K and the received HMAC and uses it as the attestation key.
HW-Mod must also be slightly modified to ensure security of
V rf’s authentication. In particular, regular software must not
be able modify the memory region that stores P rv’s counter.
Notably, the counter requires persistent and writable storage,
1 void VRASED ( u i n t 8 _ t * c h a l l e n g e , u i n t 8 _ t * r e s p o n s e ) {
2 //Copy input challenge to MAC_ADDR:
3 memcpy ( ( u i n t 8 _ t * )MAC_ADDR, c h a l l e n g e , 32) ;
4
5 //Disable interrupts:
6 _ _ d i n t ( ) ;
7
8 //Save current value of r5 and r6:
9 __asm__ volatile ("push r5" "\n\t" ) ;
10 __asm__ volatile ("push r6" "\n\t" ) ;
11
12 //Write return address of Hacl_HMAC_SHA2_256_hmac_entry
13 //to RAM:
14 __asm__ volatile ("mov #0x000e, r6" "\n\t" ) ;
15 __asm__ volatile ("mov #0x0300, r5" "\n\t" ) ;
16 __asm__ volatile ("mov r0, @(r5)" "\n\t" ) ;
17 __asm__ volatile ("add r6, @(r5)" "\n\t" ) ;
18
19 //Save the original value of the Stack Pointer (R1):
20 __asm__ volatile ("mov r1, r5" "\n\t" ) ;
21
22 //Set the stack pointer to the base of the exclusive stack:
23 __asm__ volatile ("mov #0x1000, r1" "\n\t" ) ;
24
25 //Call SW-Att:
26 Hacl_HMAC_SHA2_256_hmac_entry ( ) ;
27
28 //Copy retrieve the original stack pointer value:
29 __asm__ volatile ("mov r5, r1" "\n\t" ) ;
30
31 //Restore original r5,r6 values:
32 __asm__ volatile ("pop r6" "\n\t" ) ;
33 __asm__ volatile ("pop r5" "\n\t" ) ;
34
35 //Enable interrupts:
36 _ _ e i n t ( ) ;
37
38 //Return the HMAC value to the application:
39 memcpy ( r e s p o n s e , ( u i n t 8 _ t * )MAC_ADDR, 32) ;
40 }
Figure 15: VRASED’s wrapper function.
because SW-Att needs to modify it at the end of each attesta-
tion execution. Therefore, CT R region resides on FLASH. We
denote this region as:
• CT R = [CT Rmin,CT Rmax];
LTL Specifications (15) and (16) must hold (in addition to
the ones discussed in Section 4).
G : {¬(PC ∈CR)∧Wen ∧ (Daddr ∈CT R)→ reset } (15)
G : {DMAen ∧ (DMAaddr ∈CT R)→ reset} (16)
LTL Specification (15) ensures that regular software does not
modify P rv’s counter, while (16) ensures that the same is not
possible via the DMA controller. FSMs in Figures 8 and 11, cor-
responding to HW-Mod access control and DMA sub-modules,
must be modified to transition into Reset state according to
these new conditions. In addition, LTL Specification (7) must
be relaxed to allow SW-Att to write to CT R. Implementation
and verification of the modified version of these sub-modules
are publicly available at VRASED’s repository [1] as an op-
tional part of the design.
C VRASED API
VRASED ensures that any violation of secure RA properties is
detected and causes the system to reset. However, benign appli-
cations running on the MCU must also comply with VRASED
rules to execute successfully.
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For example, suppose that a benign application receives an
attestation request from V rf. It then needs to set up MCU soft-
ware state before SW-Att can execute. This includes: disabling
interrupts, setting the stack pointer to the reserved secure stack,
and storing the previous stack pointer, in order to restore soft-
ware state after SW-Att execution completes. If the application
fails to do this, even though RA security still holds, the system
might reach an unexpected state due to incorrect set-up before
or after SW-Att execution. For example, suppose that inter-
rupts were (erroneously) not disabled before calling SW-Att,
and an interrupt occurs during SW-Att execution, thus aborting
the application. Though not a violation of secure RA properties,
this can clearly harm the benign application.
Furthermore, setting up execution environment for SW-Att
requires knowledge of low-level architecture and assembly
instructions in order to deal directly with register state. As-
suming such knowledge might be unrealistic or unnecessary
for a typical application developer, who codes applications
using a high-level programming language, e.g., C. To this end,
we provide an API to SW-Att that takes care of necessary
configuration on the application’s behalf. VRASED API imple-
ments appropriate configurations, saves the application state,
calls SW-Att, and resumes the software state after SW-Att
execution. This makes all VRASED specifics transparent to the
application developer, making RA an easy-to-use service: a
simple function call.
VRASED API implementation is shown in Figure 15. It
starts by copying V rf’s Chal to the designated physical mem-
ory location that will be read by SW-Att. Next, to comply with
atomicity, it disables interrupts. Before calling SW-Att, the
current value of the stack pointer7 is saved and set to point to
the base of the secure stack. This is necessary to comply with
the Key Confidentiality property which ensures that SW-Att
can only execute on the reserved stack. With that last step,
software state is ready for SW-Att execution. After SW-Att
execution, the original stack pointer value and values of the
registers used to store the original stack pointer are restored
and interrupts are enabled. At this point, execution of the ap-
plication can continue and the application can reply to V rf’s
request with the attestation result.
Remark. VRASED API makes it easy for programmers to com-
ply with HW-Mod requirements before calling SW-Att. The API
itself does not (and should not) provide any security properties,
since it is executed before and after SW-Att invocation to save
and resume application execution state. Such code is not part
of SW-Att and resides in regular program memory, where it
is treated accordingly by HW-Mod’s access control rules. In
summary, it is not part of the verified design.
D FPGA Deployment and Sample Application
VRASED’s design can be synthesized and deployed in real
7In MSP430, the stack pointer is the register r1.
IoT/CPS environments. To demonstrate its practicality and
ease of use we provide, as part of VRASED’s repository [1], a
ready-to-go synthesize-able version of the architecture for the
commodity FPGA Basys3 8 (depicted in Figure 16). The design
can be easily ported to other FPGA models by mapping the
input and output ports accordingly in the Verilog’s constraints
file.
Figure 16: Basys3 FPGA running VRASED’s HW architecture de-
picted in Figure 3
1 int main ( ) {
2 u i n t 8 _ t c h a l l e n g e [ 3 2 ] ;
3 u i n t 8 _ t r e s p o n s e [ 3 2 ] ;
4 my_memset ( c h a l l e n g e , 32 , 1 ) ;
5
6 P3DIR = 0xFF ;
7 P3OUT = 0x00 ;
8 u i n t 3 2 _ t c o u n t = 0 ;
9 volatile u i n t 8 _ t b u f f e r = 0 ;
10 while ( 1 ) {
11 while ( c o u n t < 3000000) {
12 c o u n t ++;
13 }
14 c o u n t = 0 ;
15 P3OUT++;
16 if (P3OUT % 10 == 0) {
17 b u f f e r = P3OUT ;
18 P3OUT = 0xFF ;
19 VRASED( c h a l l e n g e , r e s p o n s e ) ;
20 c o u n t = 0 ;
21 P3OUT = b u f f e r ;
22 }
23
24 }
25 return 0 ;
26 }
Figure 17: Toy MSP430 application demo running VRASED’s
RA in real HW
Figure 17 presents a toy sample application written in
MSP430 C. In it, P3 is an 8-bit General Purpose Input Out-
put (GPIO) port which, in the synthesized HW, is connected
to LEDs 0-7 of Basys3 FPGA. Lines 2-4 allocate buffers for
the attestation challenge and response and initialize the chal-
lenge buffer. In practice, the challenge is received from V rf
via communication channels such as MSP430 Universal Asyn-
chronous Receiver/Transmitter (UART). For the sake of clarity
and brevity we omit the communication step from the exam-
ple and set the challenge to a constant. Line 6 in Figure 17
sets P3 GPIO as output (i.e., an actuator port) and line 7 ini-
tializes all 8 bits to zero, making all LEDs initially off. The
main application loop starts at line 10; at every iteration an
8https://store.digilentinc.com/basys-3-artix-7-fpga-trainer-board-
recommended-for-introductory-users/
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artificial delay of 3 million integer increments is introduced
and then P3 output value is incremented. This results in a bi-
nary counter being displayed on the 8 LEDs. At every time
the counter value reached a multiple of 10 (line 16), all LEDs
turn on (line 18) and the RA procedure is called in line 19 (by
default VRASED RA is computed in the entire program mem-
ory, but the range is configurable and allows for data memory
attestation as well). The LEDs remain on until the end of RA
computation. After completion of attestation, the attestation
result is saved in the response buffer and the counter re-
sumes. In practical applications, such result can be reported
back to V rf (via UART) as an authenticated measurement of
the device’s state. A demo video of this application running
on real hardware and computing RA in a small fraction of a
second is available on VRASED’s repository [1].
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